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Reform of investor-state arbitration: A perspective from Canada 
Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, September 2011 gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Canada promotes a rules-based system of international trade and investment. But this leads to 
further questions. Who interprets the rules and are they institutionally independent and neutral? 
Does the process function in Canada’s interests? In this article, it is argued that Canada should, in 
trade talks with the US and European Union, seek targeted reform of the current design of investor-
state arbitration. A useful model for doing so is Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade. The article’s 
conclusion offers some specific recommendations. 
The role of investor-state arbitration 
Investor-state arbitration is a unique form of international adjudication. It allows foreign investors to 
sue states directly under international law, without resorting first to domestic courts. It is a key 
forum in which the ambiguities in trade treaties are worked out. The resolution of these ambiguities 
leads to what one might call arbitrator-made law with important implications for businesses and 
governments. Investor-state arbitration is also of practical significance because it can lead to the 
imposition of monetary penalties or affirmative orders against states and large costs awards against 
investors.  
A primary aim of investor-state arbitration is to protect foreign investors from expropriatory, 
discriminatory, or abusive treatment at the hands of government. More broadly, the system seeks to 
encourage international investment, although there is mixed evidence on whether investment treaties 
influence firms in their investment decision-making.1 
Investor-state arbitration has been invoked in hundreds of cases involving dozens of countries. Most 
have involved a challenge to a proposed or actual law, regulation, or other government measure. 
Others have involved disputes about investor-state contracts. They have involved different areas of 
decision-making, such as tax rules, environmental laws, privatizations “gone wrong,” and direct 
expropriations in the resource sector. Aspects of the Canadian experience in investor-state 
arbitration are summarized below. 
Missing institutional safeguards 
As with other forms of adjudication, the promise of investor-state arbitration lies in its claim to 
fairness based on principles of impartiality and neutrality. Any system of adjudication that decides 
important questions of law serves this objective only if it ensures a strong measure of institutional 
independence. In this respect, there are important weaknesses in investor-state arbitration. 
The first is that the arbitrators lack security of tenure. In other international courts and tribunals, 
such as the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, members are appointed for set terms. 
1 Yackee, Jason W. (2010). Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative 
Evidence (March 22, 2010). University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1114. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1594887, as of July 4, 2011. See generally: Sauvant, K.P., and L.E. Sachs (eds.) (2009). The Effect of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
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At the domestic level, judges are typically appointed for life or until a set retirement age. Secure 
tenure is widely acknowledged as a core attribute of an independent judiciary in democratic, free-
market societies, based on the institutional separation of powers and the rule of law. Without it, as 
Lord Denning said, “The judicial power is simply a part of the executive machine.”2 
The second weakness in investor-state arbitration is the absence of a pre-established roster of 
persons from which arbitrators must be appointed. Short of judicial security of tenure, a roster is 
vital to allow quality control, public accountability, and neutrality among the arbitrators. For 
example, in the case of NAFTA, the treaty’s state-state arbitration process (but not its investor-state 
arbitration process) provides for a roster. Canada, Mexico, and the US each appoint one-third of the 
roster members prior to any specific dispute. Thus, each state has role in selecting in advance the 
arbitrators who are eligible to decide future disputes. In the case of investor-state arbitration, the 
NAFTA text refers to a roster3 but none was ever implemented by the NAFTA states. 
A third weakness is that the presiding arbitrators of tribunals are not appointed to specific cases 
through an objective and neutral method. Rather, in the absence of agreement between the disputing 
parties, the presiding arbitrator is selected by officials at organizations such as the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington or the Secretariat of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. These officials are certainly not nefarious people, 
but, harkening back to Lord Denning, it is a serious problem for adjudicator independence that any 
executive official has the power to appoint an arbitrator with prior knowledge of the specific case. In 
contrast, in NAFTA state-state arbitration, where the disputing parties cannot agree on whom to 
appoint, the panel chair is selected at random from the roster.4 
A fourth weakness of investor-state arbitration is that the arbitrators are not rigorously regulated in 
the remunerative activities that they may pursue beyond their judicial role. For the most part, those 
selected as arbitrators in investor-state arbitration are not judges (or former judges) who are 
appointed on a one-off basis in light of their eminence and detachment from the nitty-gritty of 
investment law. On the contrary, they are often repeat players in a small “club” of commercial 
arbitrators, based primarily at private bodies like the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris or 
the London Court of International Arbitration.5 Some law firms have both investor-state arbitrators 
and investor-state counsel on staff. Even if they are not working on the same case, impartiality 
problems can arise, such as in the common situation where the resolution of a legal issue in one case 
is relevant to other cases. 
A useful comparison is provided by FINRA (the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) 
arbitration in the US, which is used to resolve disputes between securities firms and their 
customers.6
2 Denning, Lord (1950). The Independence of the Judges. Address to the Holdsworth Club of the University of Birmingham (June 
16, 1950), p. 1. 
 In FINRA arbitration, due to concerns about apparent conflicts of interest, “public” 
(i.e., securities industry-independent) arbitrators are precluded from working more than 20% of their 
time in the securities industry and from being in a firm that earns more than 10% of its revenue 
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Article 1124. 
4 Ibid, Article 2011. 
5 The seminal study is Dezalay, Y., and B. Garth (1996), Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order.  
6 FINRA Code of Arbitration, sections 12100(p) and (u).  Available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096, as of July 4, 2011. 
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from that industry. FINRA arbitration also provides for the random assignment of arbitrators to 
specific cases and case lists. 
This outline of institutional weaknesses in investor-state arbitration is not meant as a criticism of 
those who sit as investor-state arbitrators. One should not ask that good people refuse to serve; in 
the end, their willingness to do so may be all that can salvage a tainted system. The point is rather 
that the current model does not support the necessary appearance of independence and impartiality 
in investor-state arbitration and does not provide an adequate foundation for a rules-based system of 
international trade and investment. 
Investor-state cases brought against Canada 
How has Canada, a country that is both a significant capital-importer and capital-exporter, fared so 
far in the process? The experience has been dominated by investor-state arbitration under NAFTA 
Chapter 11. Unlike virtually all other investment treaties, Chapter 11 applies to relations between 
two developed countries and has generated a substantial number of claims against both the US and 
Canada (typically initiated by the other’s investors). The record is summarized below.7 










Canadian NA 1 15 16 
Mexican 1 NA 1 2 
American 29 15 NA 44 
Unknown 0 1 0 1 
Totals: 30 17 16 Total claims: 63 
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims progressing beyond the filing of notice of a claim, 










Canadian NA 1 11 12 
Mexican 0 NA 0 0 
American 19 11 NA 30 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 
Totals: 19 12 11 Total claims: 42 
Thus, the federal government has faced 29 claims by US investors, although roughly one-third of 
these claims appear not to have materialized. Perhaps surprisingly, Canada has been the most 
frequently-sued NAFTA country. 
7 The author collected this data as part of an empirical project on investment treaty arbitration, drawing on academic or 
government websites that provide awards and other materials in NAFTA investor-state arbitrations. Kirsten Mikadze’s research 
assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 





There are nine NAFTA cases against Canada that have led to a final win-loss outcome. In these 
cases, Canada has a mixed record. Three early cases were lost, one based on a fairly capitulatory 
settlement,8 and the others led to a modest award against Canada.9
 
 
More recently, Canada settled two NAFTA claims by American investors. In Abitibi Bowater, Canada 
paid about US $130 million for the expropriation of properties and water/ timber rights in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. In Dow AgroSciences, the claim was settled based on Quebec agreeing 
to a statement that the pesticide 2,4-D does not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the 
environment, if used according to instructions.10
 
 
Canada has also had important “wins” in defending NAFTA cases. These have included successful 
defences against challenges to the national system of postal delivery, pesticide regulation, lumber 
export management, and income trusts. In each of these cases, the claim was rejected without a 
monetary award against Canada.11
 
 
Finally, there are numerous ongoing cases against Canada, although many are inactive. The active 
cases involve disputes over, for example, research and development expenditures in the offshore oil 
sector in Newfoundland and Labrador, implementation of the Green Energy Act in Ontario, a federal-
provincial environmental assessment that blocked a proposed quarry in Nova Scotia, and two cases 
involving hunting and fishing licences in the Northwest Territories and Quebec. 
 
Canada’s experience in defending NAFTA claims, on win-loss outcomes, is thus mixed. As well, 
Canada has not faced claims under the various other investment treaties that it has concluded with 
developing countries. However, if an investor-state mechanism is adopted in the proposed Canada-
EU trade agreement, Canada would likely assume a higher risk of claims under that agreement as 
well as under NAFTA.12
 
 
Investor-state cases brought by Canadian investors 
 
In contrast to Canada’s experience defending claims, Canadian investors have an exceedingly poor 
record in investor-state arbitration. As claimants under NAFTA, they have sued the US government 
nine times and lost every case (not including ongoing cases, of which only a few appear to be 
active).13
                                                          
8 Ethyl v Canada, in which Canada is understood to have settled a challenge to restrictions on a gasoline additive by paying about 
$16 million in compensation to the investor, issuing a statement that the gasoline additive did not pose a health or environmental 
threat, and withdrawing the restrictions. 
 In some NAFTA cases, such as Methanex and Glamis Gold, Canadian investors not only lost 
9 SD Myers v Canada (award against Canada of about US $6 million plus interest and costs); Pope & Talbot v Canada (award 
against Canada of about US $500,000 plus interest and costs). 
10 However, Quebec was able to maintain its legislative ban on the use of 2,4-D and other pesticides as a risk-avoidance measure. 
Other than the statement itself, no compensation was provided in exchange for withdrawal of Dow Chemical’s NAFTA claim for 
US $2 million for the economic impact of the ban. 
11 UPS v Canada; Chemtura v Canada; Merrill and Ring Forestry v Canada; and Gottlieb v Canada.  
12 The potential inclusion of an investor-state mechanism in the Canada-EU trade agreement would expand opportunities for US 
investor claims against Canada under NAFTA if the Canada-EU agreement omitted NAFTA-style exceptions for existing sub-
national measures (NAFTA, Article 1108(1)). Faced with a Canada-EU agreement that did not exempt such measures, arbitrators 
would likely read down the NAFTA exception by referring to the NAFTA principle of most-favoured-nation treatment, thus 
allowing NAFTA claims to be brought against provincial and municipal measures in Canada, but not state and local measures in 
the US which would continue to be protected by the exception. 
13 ADF v US; Canfor v US; CCFT v US; Glamis Gold v US; Loewen v US; Methanex v US; Mondev v US; Tembec v US; Terminal 
v US. 





the case but were hit with a large costs award in favour of the US government. In some cases, many 




In Loewen, a major Canadian funeral home company was driven into bankruptcy after a jury in 
Mississippi awarded US $500 million, including $75 million for emotional distress and $400 million 
in punitive damages, against the Canadian investor after a civil trial. The civil lawsuit had involved a 
contractual dispute over assets worth not more than $4 million. Loewen was unable to appeal the 
award to the Mississippi Supreme Court after the Court declined to waive a requirement that an 
appellant, as a condition of appeal, file a bond worth 125% of the damages award at trial. 
 
In the ensuing NAFTA arbitration, the tribunal reviewed the Mississippi trial and characterized it as 
“a disgrace” “[b]y any standard of measurement.”15 Nevertheless, the tribunal dismissed Loewen’s 
claim on the ground that Loewen should have sought a final appeal at the US Supreme Court, as a 
substantive requirement of NAFTA’s minimum standard of protection (although NAFTA does not 
contain a duty to exhaust local remedies as a condition of bringing a claim), before initiating a 
NAFTA claim. At the conclusion of its award, the tribunal made this intriguing statement:16
 
 
We think it right to add one final word. A reader following our account of the injustices 
which were suffered by Loewen and Mr. Raymond Loewen in the Courts of Mississippi 
could well be troubled to find that they emerge from the present long and costly proceedings 
with no remedy at all. After all, we have held that judicial wrongs may in principle be 
brought home to the State Party under [NAFTA] Chapter Eleven, and have criticised the 
Mississippi proceedings in the strongest terms. There was unfairness here towards the 
foreign investor. Why not use the weapons at hand to put it right? What clearer case than the 
present could there be for the ideals of NAFTA to be given some teeth?  
 
This human reaction has been present in our minds throughout but we must be on guard 
against allowing it to control our decision. [….] Too great a readiness to step from outside 
into the domestic arena, attributing the shape of an international wrong to what is really a 
local error (however serious), will damage both the integrity of the domestic judicial system 
and the viability of NAFTA itself. The natural instinct, when someone observes a 
miscarriage of justice, is to step in and try to put it right, but the interests of the international 
investing community demand that we must observe the principles which we have been 
appointed to apply, and stay our hands.  
 
One reading of this statement is that the tribunal thought itself bound to adhere to the customary 
duty to exhaust local remedies in international law, despite the apparent injustice that this might 
produce and the evident removal of such a duty in NAFTA. Another reading of the statement, 
especially its last line, is that the tribunal thought it prudent to downplay Loewen’s mistreatment in 
order to protect the “interests of the international investing community” from a political reaction 
against NAFTA in the US. If this was a motivation for the tribunal’s decision, one wonders what 
                                                          
14 Loewen Group Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 
2003. Available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Loewen-Award-2.pdf, as of July 4, 2011. 
15 Ibid, para. 119. 
16 Ibid, para. 241-2. 





protections NAFTA really offers to Canadian investors who experience mistreatment at the hands 
of a public authority in the US. 
 
After the Loewen award was issued, the US-appointed member of the tribunal, former US 
Congressman and appellate judge Abner Mikva, gave a presentation at Pace Law School in which he 
recounted that, after agreeing to serve on the tribunal, he met with US Department of Justice 
officials. “You know, judge,” he was told by the officials, “if we lose this case we could lose 
NAFTA.” “Well, if you want to put pressure on me,” Mikva replied, “then that does it.”17
 
 
If a former US judge, appointed on a one-off basis, could be approached in this way by a disputing 
party in a NAFTA investor-state arbitration, then in what ways might powerful actors influence 
lawyers who stake much of their careers as arbitrators in the field? This larger concern about 
inappropriate influences in investor-state arbitration was highlighted by a Dutch arbitrator and 
former banker, Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen, who in August 2010 aired allegations of interference by staff 
at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in the deliberations of an 
arbitration panel on which he served.18 Dalhuisen stated in his reasons for judgment:19
 
 
“What hovers over all of this is the potentially pernicious impact of the desire for 
(re)appointment in many [arbitrators], not least for financial gain, in which not only 
withholding from the parties relevant information... but also incurring the favour of the 
[ICSID] Secretariat, may be important issues in terms of independence....” 
 
Although not evidence of actual bias in any specific case, the winless record of Canadian investors in 
NAFTA cases against the US gives cause for concern, especially because it draws attention to 
aspects of the institutional structure that create an apprehension of bias. 
 
Notably, Canadian investors have also lost repeatedly under other investment treaties in all seven 
known cases that have led to a final outcome. This has included cases against Costa Rica, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela.20
 
 
Overall, the record of Canadian investors in known arbitrations is 0 wins and 16 losses. This raises 
the question of whether Canadian interests, and perhaps other countries, are well-served by investor-
state arbitration. In particular, in the ongoing Canada-EU trade negotiations, it is an open question 
why Canada would push to include an investor-state mechanism in a trade agreement between states 
with mature domestic courts that are available to foreign investors. There are good reasons, at the 
very least, to reconsider the investor-state model in NAFTA and any Canada-EU agreement in order 




                                                          
17 D. Schneiderman (2010). “Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting 
Outcomes” Northwestern Journal of International and Business Law 30 (2): 383-416 at 404-5.   
18 Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment Panel Decision of 10 August 2010. 
Available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/VivendiSecondAnnulmentDecision.pdf, as of July 4, 2011. 
19 Ibid, para. 25  
20 Anderson v Costa Rica; Ulemek v Croatia; Frontier Petroleum Services v Czech Republic; Encana v Ecuador; International 
Thunderbird v Mexico; Mihaly v Sri Lanka; Vannessa Ventures v Venezuela. 





A comparison to the Agreement on Internal Trade 
 
The person-to-government arbitration process under Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade21
 
 was 
modeled on NAFTA investor-state arbitration in that it allows a business resident in one Canadian 
jurisdiction to sue the government of another. However, the AIT incorporated a number of 
important safeguards.  
First, person-to-government arbitration under the AIT is based on a roster of arbitrators, appointed 
by the governments that concluded the agreement.22
 
 This allows for quality control and public 
accountability, while supporting independence and neutrality. 
Second, the AIT has a mandatory code of conduct for arbitrators.23
 
 Among other things, the code 
requires arbitrators to “observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of 
the dispute settlement process is preserved.” It includes ongoing disclosure obligations – including 
in relation to professional relationships of the arbitrator or the arbitrator’s employer – with persons 
who may benefit from the outcome of the proceeding or from any issue that may be decided. In the 
absence of judicial security of tenure, these are important checks. 
Third, the AIT requires that panel chairs have expertise in administrative law.24
 
 Speaking as an 
academic who specializes in administrative law, I would of course support this requirement in all 
instruments that authorize investor-state arbitration. Jests aside, this area of expertise is useful in 
investor-state arbitration because, typically, the disputes arise from laws, regulations, or similar 
measures passed by governments, rather than from commercial acts of another private party. (I 
should add, perhaps, that I have not worked as a lawyer or arbitrator in investor-state arbitration and 
have no aspiration to do so.) 
Fourth, the AIT has a screening mechanism.25
 
 Claims are referred first to an independent officer, 
often a former trade negotiator, academic, or lawyer, who is appointed by the home province of the 
person bringing the claim. The screener has the authority to cull claims that are frivolous or 
vexatious, that are harassing, or that do not show a reasonable case of injury or denial of benefits. I 
suspect the mechanism may not be popular among any lawyers who may be keen to see litigation 
under the AIT, but it has the benefit of saving the parties from expensive and arduous arbitrations 
of claims that are unlikely to succeed. 
The AIT setup does not satisfy entirely the standards of independence of a domestic or international 
court but it delivers a much greater measure of independence than investor-state arbitration. This is 
primarily because the arbitrators are appointed in an objective manner from a set roster and because 
there are mandatory checks on activities that may generate conflicts of interest. 
 
                                                          
21 Agreement on Internal Trade, Consolidated Version 2010, ch. 17, part B. Available at http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/ait.htm, 
as of July 4, 2011.  
22 Ibid, Article 1715 and Annex 1704. 
23 Ibid, Annex 1719. A binding code of conduct is also needed for persons acting as counsel in investor-state arbitration. See 
Bishop, Doak (2010). Ethics in International Arbitration. Presentation to the XXth Congress of the International Council on 
Commercial Arbitration, Rio de Janeiro, May 23-26, 2010. Available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12763302233510/icca_rio_keynote_speech.pdf, as of July 4, 2011.   
24 Ibid, Article 1715(1).  
25 Ibid, Article 1712. 





Conclusion and recommendation 
 
In border and trade talks with the US and the European Union, Canada should seek to improve the 
institutional framework of investor-state arbitration. As it happens, one of the best models appears 
to be a Canadian one: the Agreement on Internal Trade. Based on this model and its underlying 
principles, Canada should target these improvements in investor-state arbitration: 
 
• a pre-set roster from which all arbitrators would be appointed; 
• an objective method to select tribunal chairs where the parties do not agree; 
• rigorous checks on outside remunerative activities by arbitrators; 
• a binding code of conduct for arbitrators; 
• a duty to resort to reasonably-available local remedies, especially in the case of states with mature 
domestic court systems; and 
• an independent screening process to weed out claims that are frivolous, harassing, or unlikely to 
succeed. 
 
These adjustments would remove apparent conflicts of interest among investor-state arbitrators. 
They would support a fair and neutral process of dispute settlement as an integral part of a rules-
based system of trade and investment. And they fit closely with the values and interests of Canada 
and other trading nations committed to the rule of law. 
 
